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Suppose	that	you	possess	strong,	perhaps	decisive,	evidence	for	a	proposition	that	you’re	
considering.	It	is	natural	to	think	that	that	you	thereby	possess	a	reason	to	believe	that	
proposition.	What	explains	this?	Why	is	there	such	a	connection	between	evidence	for	(or	
against)	propositions	and	reasons	for	(dis)believing	them?	What,	in	other	words,	are	the	
grounds	of	epistemic	normativity?		
	
There	are	a	number	of	different	candidate	answers	to	this	question.	One	candidate	is	that	
epistemic	normativity	doesn’t	have	any	grounds.	According	to	this	view,	there	are	just	some	
basic	–	that	is	ungrounded	–	truths	about	what	we	ought	to	believe.	At	the	other	end	of	the	
spectrum	is	the	view	that	epistemic	normativity	is	grounded	in	practical	normativity.	
According	to	this	view,	epistemic	reasons	for	belief	are	explained	by	the	contribution	that	
believing	in	light	of	the	evidence	makes	to	prudential,	moral	or	aesthetic	ends.	Neither	of	
these	views	is	ideal.	The	former	isn’t	much	of	an	explanation	at	all.	It	makes	epistemic	
normativity	a	fundamental	constituent	of	reality.1	The	latter	struggles	with	the	fact	that	
believing	evidentially	supported	propositions	isn’t	always	of	practical	value,	and	the	fact	
that	it	sometimes	seems	to	be	of	practical	value	to	have	evidentially	unsupported	beliefs.	Of	
course,	defenders	of	these	views	have	developed	sophisticated	responses	to	these	basic	
charges.	But	the	fundamental	problems	remain.	It	would	be	ideal	if	there	were	some	happy	
middle-ground;	if	epistemic	normativity	were	neither	ungrounded,	nor	grounded	in	the	
practical.	That	could	allow	us	to	avoid	the	problems	that	each	approach	faces.	Interestingly,	
there	is	a	candidate	for	occupying	this	middle	ground.	The	candidate	is	that	epistemic	
normativity	is	grounded	in	the	nature	of	the	attitude	of	belief.	This	view	is	now	often	
referred	to	as	constitutivism,	or,	more	fully,	constitutivism	about	epistemic	normativity.	The	
idea	is	that	the	nature	of	belief	explains	why	have	reasons	to	believe,	or	disbelieve,	
propositions	in	light	of	evidence	possessed	for,	or	against,	them.	
	
How	is	this	meant	to	work?	The	idea	is	that	the	concept	of	belief	is	normative.	This	means	
that	for	an	attitude	to	fall	under	the	concept	‘belief’	is	just	for	it	to	stand	in	normative	
relations	to	a	certain	property	(or	properties).	This	property	is	said	to	be	the	correctness	
condition	for	belief.	Belief’s	correctness	condition	is	typically	claimed	to	be	truth;	
specifically,	the	truth	of	the	proposition	believed.	We	can	therefore	express	constitutivism	
about	epistemic	normativity	as	follows:	
	 	
TRUTH	NORM:	It	is	a	conceptual	truth	about	belief	that	it	is	correct	to	believe	a	
proposition	if	and	only	if	it	is	true.2	
																																																						
1	Though	for	a	defence	of	something	close	to	this	view,	see	Kyriacou	(this	volume).	
2	It	should	be	noted	that	one	could	claim	that	a	belief	is	correct	just	in	case	it’s	true	without	
being	committed	to	TRUTH	NORM.	TRUTH	NORM	also	claims	this	norm	is	constitutive	of	
belief.	We	are	concentrating	on	this	latter	claim,	because	only	it	would	be	able	to	provide	
the	grounds	of	epistemic	normativity.	If	belief	is	subject	to	a	truth	norm	but	not	essentially	
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Constitutivism	offers	an	explanation	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	belief	for	why	there	are	
normative	relations	between	belief	and	truth.	And	once	this	in	place,	it	isn’t	a	big	leap	–	the	
thought	is	–	to	explain	why	there	are	normative	relations	between	belief	and	evidence	
(evidence	being	an	indicator	of	truth).	We	now	have	an	account	of	the	grounds	of	epistemic	
normativity.		
	
Does	this	constitutivist	explanation	of	epistemic	normativity	work?	Our	focus	will	not	be	on	
whether	TRUTH	NORM,	if	accepted,	can	ground	epistemic	normativity.	The	aim	of	this	
article	is	to	assess	the	arguments	that	have	been	given	for	TRUTH	NORM.	We	will	ask	
whether	these	arguments	are	persuasive,	and	we	will	claim	that	they	are	not.	We	will	claim	
that	there	is	insufficient	reason	to	accept	TRUTH	NORM.	A	fortiori	there	is	insufficient	
reason	to	think	that	TRUTH	NORM	is	the	correct	explanation	of	the	grounds	of	epistemic	
normativity.	
	
There	are	a	range	of	different	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	(for	a	survey,	see	McHugh	and	
Whiting	2014).	As	such,	one	might	expect	that	we	would	have	to	proceed	in	a	piecemeal	
fashion,	taking	each	argument	for	TRUTH	NORM	in	turn.	Our	ambition,	however,	is	to	take	a	
more	unified	approach.	We	aim	to	present	a	common	strategy.	We	aim	to	show	that	some	
key	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	fail	for	a	common	reason.	They	fail	because	TRUTH	NORM	
fails	to	provide	a	good	explanation	of	the	phenomena	that	it	is	meant	to	explain.	More	
precisely,	we	will	claim	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	falter	on	a	dilemma.	The	dilemma	is	as	
follows:	
	
DILEMMA:	TRUTH	NORM	is	appealed	to	as	the	best	explanation	of	some	phenomenon	
(the	explanandum).	
	
(i) Either	TRUTH	NORM	doesn’t	look	like	it	best	explains	the	explanandum	in	
question.	
(ii) Or	TRUTH	NORM	can	explain	the	explanandum,	but	only	if	it	is	supplemented	by	
an	implausible	claim	about	following	prescriptions.	
	
Either	way,	TRUTH	NORM	fails	to	provide	the	best	explanation	for	the	phenomenon	in	
question.	Given	that	the	ability	to	provide	such	an	explanation	is	the	reason	for	positing	
TRUTH	NORM,	we	shouldn’t	posit	TRUTH	NORM.		
	
This	is	our	DILEMMA.	We	will	apply	it	in	two	specific	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM:	first	to	an	
argument	based	on	deliberative	transparency;	second	to	an	argument	for	based	on	Moore-
paradoxical	sentences.	Part	of	what	is	interesting	about	our	strategy	is	that	we	are	drawing	
together	these	seemingly	distinct	arguments	for	and	against	TRUTH	NORM	in	a	simple,	
unifying	way.	We	will	begin	(section	1)	by	making	some	preliminary	remarks	about	how	our	
approach	differs	from	and,	we	think,	improves	upon	existing	opposition	to	TRUTH	NORM.	
																																																						
so,	that	would	be	a	substantial	first-order	epistemological	fact,	but	it	wouldn’t	be	able	to	
ground	epistemic	normativity.	This	point	is	not	often	clearly	made	in	the	literature	on	truth	
norms	(though	see	McHugh	2013,	463;	Steglich-Petersen	2013,	279,	fn.	2;	Greenberg	2017,	
chap.	2).	
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We	will	then	(section	2)	show	how	our	strategy	applies	against	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	
based	on	deliberative	transparency.	We	will	then	(section	3)	show	how	this	strategy	applies	
against	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	based	on	Moore-paradoxical	sentences.	We	then	
conclude	(section	4).	
	
1. What	distinguishes	our	argument	from	other	arguments	against	TRUTH	NORM	
	
The	argument	that	we	will	develop	against	TRUTH	NORM	differs	from	some	of	the	existing	
arguments	in	the	literature.	In	particular	there	are	two	important	kinds	of	criticism	that	
have	been	made	of	TRUTH	NORM	that	our	argument	should	be	distinguished	from.	
	
One	influential	criticism	of	TRUTH	NORM	concerns	the	precise	content	of	the	norm	that	is	
alleged	to	be	constitutive	of	belief.	There	has	been	considerable	debate	about	whether	a	
truth	norm	can	be	formulated	in	such	a	way	as	to	avoid	implausible	prescriptions	–	such	as	
that	one	ought	to	believe	ungraspably	complex	truths	and	a	prescription	believe	‘true	
blindspots’,	(Bykvist	and	Hattiangadi	2007,	2013).	We	will	set	this	aside	however,	and	grant	
that	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	has	some	response	to	this	criticism.	
	
A	second	important	criticism	of	TRUTH	NORM	is	the	‘correctness’	of	beliefs	it	refers	to	is	not	
‘heavy	duty’	enough	to	do	any	epistemological	or	metaphysical	work	(Côté-Bouchard	2016;	
cf.	Rosen	2001,	619–21;	Bykvist	and	Hattiangadi	2013,	sec.	2).	How	our	argument	differs	
from	this	is	somewhat	complex.	While	our	conclusion	is	the	same	–	that	TRUTH	NORM	does	
not	best	explain	the	nature	of	belief	–	our	argument	targets	a	later	stage	in	the	dialectic.	
The	arguments	we	will	be	rejecting	–	which	claim	that	TRUTH	NORM	is	required	to	explain	
deliberative	transparency	and	Moore’s	paradox	–	can	be	understood	as	attempts	to	argue,	
contra	the	above	criticism,	that	belief’s	correctness	conditions	have	to	be	understood	as	
genuinely	normative.	Our	conclusion	is	that	this	is	not	true:	these	phenomena	do	not	
mandate	a	genuinely	normative	understanding	of	belief’s	correctness	conditions.		
	
2. Does	TRUTH	NORM	explain	deliberative	transparency?	
	
One	influential	argument	for	TRUTH	NORM	is	that	it	best	explains	the	transparency	of	
doxatic	deliberation.	We	will	begin	by	outlining	this	argument,	largely	following	the	
presentations	of	it	given	by	Nishi	Shah	and	David	Velleman	(Shah	2003,	260–74;	Shah	and	
Velleman	2005,	500–502),	before	criticising	it	through	our	DILEMMA	(in	§§2.1-2.2).		
	
When	we	deliberate	as	to	whether	to	believe	that	p,	we	recognise	that	this	question	
inevitably	gives	way	to	the	question	of	whether	p	is	true.	Furthermore,	not	only	is	the	
deliberative	question	of	whether	to	believe	that	p	answered	by	the	factual	question	of	
whether	p	is	true,	it	is	only	answered	by	that	question,	to	the	exclusion	of	any	other	
considerations,	such	as	whether	believing	that	p	would	be	in	one’s	interests.	This	is	what	it	
means	to	say	that	deliberation	about	what	to	believe	is	transparent.	What	explains	this	
phenomenon?	Arguably	the	obvious	place	to	look	for	an	explanation	is	to	the	existence	of	a	
tight	relationship	between	belief	and	truth,	because	the	phenomenon	just	is	one	of	a	
question	about	belief	giving	way	to	a	question	about	truth.	TRUTH	NORM	prescribes	that	we	
believe	p	if	and	only	if	p	is	true.	Consequently,	when	we	deliberate	about	whether	to	
believe	p,	we	will	–	if	we	follow	that	norm	–	simply	deliberate	about	whether	p	is	true.	The	
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transparency	of	deliberation	is	explained.	So	TRUTH	NORM	can	explain	the	transparency	of	
deliberation.		
	
This	shows	that	TRUTH	NORM	is	a	sensible	way	of	explaining	transparency.	But	why	think	it	
is	the	best	explanation?	The	main	reason	given	by	its	defenders	is	that	it	provides	a	better	
explanation	than	alternative	dispositional	accounts	of	belief.	To	explain	the	exclusive	focus	
on	truth	in	deliberation,	the	dispositions	specific	to	belief	(that	dispositional	accounts	posit)	
would	need	to	dispositions	to	form,	maintain,	and	revise	beliefs	in	and,	crucially,	only	in	
response	to	truth-relevant	considerations.	Call	this	the	strong	dispositional	account.	
	
The	fact	that	a	dispositional	account	of	belief	would	have	to	be	‘strong’	in	this	respect	in	
order	to	explain	transparency	is	the	reason	why	TRUTH	NORM	is	claimed	to	provide	a	better	
explanation.	Take	a	step	back.	Note	that	although	when	we	deliberate	about	whether	to	
believe	p	we	simply	consider	whether	p	is	true,	not	all	of	our	beliefs	are	like	this.	
Sometimes,	what	we	believe	is	determined	by	our	desires	and	other	conative	states,	in	
cases	of	wishful	thinking.	The	key	datum,	according	to	defenders	of	TRUTH	NORM,	is	that	
wishful	thinking	doesn’t	exert	its	influence	within	conscious	deliberation.		
	
This	presents	a	problem	for	the	strong	dispositional	account.	On	this	account,	the	products	
of	wishful	thinking	would	not	count	as	beliefs.	Now	one	could	respond	to	this	by	weakening	
the	dispositional	connection	between	belief	and	truth	so	as	to	allow	for	the	products	of	
wishful	thinking	to	count	as	beliefs,	and	defend	what	we	can	call	the	weak	dispositional	
account.	But	a	defender	of	this	view	can	no	longer	explain	why,	when	we	consciously	
deliberate	about	whether	to	believe	that	p,	we	simply	deliberate	as	to	whether	p	is	true.	On	
her	account,	it	should,	in	principle,	be	possible	to	deliberate	about	whether	p,	and	be	
moved	in	those	deliberations	in	part	by	non-truth	related	(e.g.	conative)	considerations.	But,	
ex	hypothesi,	it’s	not.	So	this	weak	dispositional	account	fails	too.	
	
In	fact,	we	can	represent	the	failings	of	both	of	the	dispositional	accounts	as	follows:	
	
	 Explains	Transparency	in	
Deliberation?	
Allows	for	the	Possibility	of	
(Non-Del.)	Wishful	Beliefs?	
Strong	Dispositional	Account	 Yes	 No	
Weak	Dispositional	Account	 No	 Yes	
	
Neither	of	these	accounts	works	because	neither	can	answer	‘yes’	to	both	questions.	This	is	
where	the	real	strength	of	TRUTH	NORM	comes	in.	TRUTH	NORM	seems	able	to	answer	
‘yes’	to	both:	
	
TRUTH	NORM	 Yes	 Yes	
	
Why	is	this?	The	key	point	is	that	TRUTH	NORM	is	a	view	about	the	concept	of	belief.	This	is	
key	because	and	when	we	deliberate	about	what	to	believe,	the	concept	of	belief	is	playing	
a	role	in	framing	what	we	do,	whereas	it	isn’t	in	ordinary	non-deliberative	belief-formation.	
It	is	this	that	allows	TRUTH	NORM	to	explain	transparency	in	deliberation,	whilst	still	
allowing	for	the	possibility	of	wishful	thought.	And	so,	it	is	this	that	makes	TRUTH	NORM	the	
best	explanation	of	transparency	in	deliberation.	
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2.1 Transparency	in	deliberation:	Our	DILEMMA	
	
We	don’t	think	that	this	is	a	good	argument	for	TRUTH	NORM.	We	can	show	why	by	
appealing	to	the	following	DILEMMA:	
	
DILEMMA:	TRUTH	NORM	is	appealed	to	as	the	best	explanation	of	the	transparency	of	
deliberation.	But	(we	argue):	
	
(i) Either	TRUTH	NORM	doesn’t	look	like	it	best	explains	the	explanandum	in	
question.	
(ii) Or	TRUTH	NORM	can	explain	the	explanandum,	but	only	if	it	is	supplemented	by	
an	implausible	claim	about	our	motivations	to	follow	prescriptions.	
	
We	will	make	the	case	quickly	before	expanding	on	it	in	what	follows.	The	suggestion	that	
this	argument	for	TRUTH	NORM	has	a	problem	with	motivation	was	first	suggested	by	
Asbjørn	Steglich-Petersen	(2006),	and	was	further	developed	by	Conor	McHugh	(2013).	But	
we	extend	this	point,	and,	crucially,	in	the	following	section	we	attempt	to	show	that	is	
generalises	to	attempts	to	use	TRUTH	NORM	to	respond	to	Moore’s	paradox.	
	
Let’s	begin	with	horn	(ii).	According	to	defenders	of	TRUTH	NORM,	deliberative	
transparency	works	as	follows.	The	concept	of	belief	prescribes	believing	p	iff	p	is	true.	
Deliberation	about	what	to	believe	is	framed	by	the	concept	of	belief,	according	to	
defenders	of	TRUTH	NORM,	because	it	aims	to	an	answer	the	question	whether	to	believe	
that	p.	So,	given	that	it’s	part	of	the	concept	of	belief	that	a	belief	is	correct	iff	it	is	true,	a	
deliberator	about	what	to	believe	will	necessarily	take	themselves	to	be	under	this	
prescription.	So	they	will	try	to	accept	the	proposition	about	which	they	are	deliberating	iff	
it	is	true.	This	explains	why	their	deliberation	is	transparent;	it	explains	why	the	only	
consideration	they	regard	as	relevant	is	p’s	truth,	and	not,	for	example,	whether	believing	p	
is	in	their	interest.	
	
One	of	the	obvious	problems	with	this	story	is	that	it	seems	to	require	a	very	strong	
connection	between	(a)	taking	oneself	to	be	under	a	prescription	to	behave	in	some	way,	
and	(b)	actually	behaving	in	that	way.	It	seems	to	require	that	because	deliberators	will	take	
themselves	to	be	under	a	prescription	to	believe	that	p	iff	p	is	true,	they	will	actually	try	to	
do	that.	We	can	label	it	as	follows:	
	
(1) If	you	take	it	to	be	correct	for	you	to	V,	then	you	will	be	motivated	to	V.		
	
This	is	a	form	of	‘judgement	internalism’.	But	it	isn’t	a	plausible	form.	Frequently,	we	take	
ourselves	to	be	under	a	prescription	to	behave	in	some	way,	yet	we	don’t	try	to	behave	in	
that	way.	So	(1)	looks	like	a	bad	principle.	It’s	far	too	strong	to	be	true.	This	is	borne	out	by	
considering	the	forms	of	judgement	internalism	actually	defended	by	moral	philosophers.	
Those	who	claim	that	there	is	some	necessary	connection	between	judging	an	action	to	be	
morally	right	(or	good,	correct,	or	what	one	ought	to	do)	and	being	motivated	to	perform	
that	action	typically	claim	that	this	connection	is,	in	various	ways	defeasible.	Some	claim	
that	the	moral	judgement	necessarily	results	in	some	motivation	to	act,	but	not	necessarily	
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overriding	motivation;	others	claim	that	moral	judgement	necessarily	results	in	motivation	
to	act	in	ideal	circumstances,	or	if	one	is	rational	(for	a	survey,	see	Svavarsdottir	1999,	sec.	
1).	A	representative	example	of	this	kind	of	judgement	internalism	is	put	forward	by	
Michael	Smith:		
	
“[A]gents	who	judge	it	right	to	act	in	various	ways	are	so	motivated,	and	necessarily	
so,	absent	the	distorting	influences	of	weakness	of	the	will	and	other	similar	forms	of	
practical	unreason	on	their	motivation.”	(Smith	1994,	61)	
	
These	qualified	versions	of	judgement	internalism	are	typically	defended,	as	the	passage	
from	Smith	indicates,	because	a	version	of	internalism	without	such	qualifications	would	
have	the	implausible	consequence	that	it	would	be	impossible	to	judge	that	something	is	
right	but	fail	to	do	so	out	of	weakness	of	the	will,	deep	depression,	etc.	But	these	kinds	of	
cases	of	irrationality	also	show	that	a	principle	like	(1)	–	which	expresses	a	simple	
entailment	between	judging	it	to	be	correct	to	V	and	being	motivated	to	V	–	is	implausible.	
	
Can	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	accept	that	form	of	internalism	expressed	in	(1)	is	
implausibly	strong?	This	leads	us	onto	horn	(i).	Perhaps,	she	might	argue,	it	is	possible	that	
we	do	sometimes	take	ourselves	to	be	under	the	prescription	of	TRUTH	NORM,	yet	fail	to	
follow	it.	The	result	is	that	in	some	cases	we	will	be	able	to	deliberate	as	to	whether	to	
believe	that	p,	yet	not	be	sensitive	only	to	truth-directed	related	considerations.	But,	the	
defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	might	claim	this	is	ok	because	deliberation	isn’t	always	
transparent.	This	would	be	true	if	there	are	certain	cases	of	self-conscious	epistemic	akrasia,	
in	which	someone	judges	that	the	evidence	suggests	that	p	is	true,	but	doesn’t	believe	that	
p.	In	fact,	Pascal	Engel	defends	the	claim	that	the	truth	norm	need	not	necessarily	motivate	
by	appealing	to	cases	of	this	kind:		
	
“Just	as	cases	of	akrasia	or	accedia	can	arise	where	the	agent	considers	the	norm	
but	does	not	follow	it,	cases	where	the	norm	of	truth	is	considered	by	the	agent	but	
is	not	followed	can	arise.”	(Engel	2007,	199,	cf.	2006,	369–72)	
	
If	this	is	correct,	then	the	defence	of	TRUTH	NORM	need	no	longer	rely	on	a	very	strong	
connection	between	the	prescriptions	that	we	take	ourselves	to	be	under,	and	our	tendency	
to	follow	them.	This	is	because	the	explanandum	has	now	changed;	what	is	now	to	be	
explained	is	a	general	tendency	for	deliberation	to	be	transparent.	But	the	problem	is	that	
TRUTH	NORM	now	loses	its	unique	explanatory	power.	A	weak	dispositional	account	–	one	
which	claims	that	belief	is	essentially	responsive	to	be	truth-relevant	considerations,	but	not	
exclusively	so	–	can	explain	a	mere	general	tendency	for	deliberation	to	be	transparent.	We	
don’t	need	TRUTH	NORM	any	more.3	
	
That’s	the	general	structure	of	the	DILEMMA.	In	horn	(ii)	a	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	is	
shown	to	rely	on	a	very	strong	connection	between	putting	oneself	under	a	prescription	to	
behave	in	some	way,	and	behaving	in	that	way.	And	in	trying	to	escape	horn	(ii)	the	
explanandum	(transparency	in	deliberation)	has	to	be	weakened	to	avoid	this	commitment.	
																																																						
3	This	point	is	made	by	Andrei	Buleandra	(2009,	328–31).	
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This	then	lands	the	defender	of	truth	norm	on	horn	(i)	because	it	results	in	TRUTH	NORM	
losing	its	unique	explanatory	appeal.		
	
What	are	the	best	lines	of	response	to	our	DILEMMA?	We	will	argue	that	all	the	obvious	
moves	that	might	be	made	by	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	still	fall	on	one	of	the	two	
horns.	Either	they	involve	implausibly	strong	claims	about	motivation,	or	they	have	the	
result	that	TRUTH	NORM	does	not	best	explain	transparency.	
	
2.2 Can	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	claim	epistemic	akrasia	is	impossible?	
	
One	move	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	could	make	is	to	claim	that	the	strong	version	of	
internalism	expressed	by	(1)	is	not,	as	we	claim,	implausible	if	it	is	just	restricted	to	belief.	
One	might	argue,	according	to	this	line	of	thought,	that	(1)	is	implausible	in	relation	to	
action,	because	practical	akrasia	–	self-consciously	acting	contrary	to	what	one	judges	to	be	
correct	to	do	–	is	a	real	and	familiar	phenomenon.	However,	one	could	claim	that	(1)	is	
plausible	if	restricted	to	belief.	One	might	try	and	motivate	this	claim	by	arguing	that	
epistemic	akrasia	–	self-consciously	believing	contrary	to	what	one	judges	to	be	correct	–	is	
not	in	fact	possible.	This	kind	of	claim	is	made	by	Philip	Pettit	and	Michael	Smith:	
	
“Imagine	that	your	beliefs	run	counter	to	what	evidence	and	fact	require.	In	such	a	case,	
your	beliefs	will	not	allow	those	requirements	to	remain	visible	because	the	offending	
beliefs	themselves	give	you	your	sense	of	what	is	and	your	sense	of	what	appears	to	be.	
You	are	therefore	denied	an	experience	whose	content	is	that	you	are	believing	such	
and	such	in	defiance	of	the	requirements	of	fact	and	evidence.	(Pettit	and	Smith	1996,	
448)	
	
Pettit	and	Smith	claim	that	epistemic	akrasia	is	impossible	because,	roughly,	one’s	
judgement	about	the	correctness	of	one’s	belief	that	p	just	is	one’s	belief	about	whether	p.		
This	provides	a	response	to	our	DILEMMA	is	because	this	alleged	impossibility	of	epistemic	
akrasia	could	be	claimed	to	support	the	strong	form	of	internalism	expressed	in	(1)	(if	
restricted	to	belief).	This	is	because	it	would	show	that	judging	that	it’s	correct	to	believe	
that	p	does	in	fact	entail	being	motivated	to	believe	that	p.4	
	
We	don’t	think	this	escapes	our	DILEMMA.	Our	response	is	that	the	claim	that	epistemic	
akrasia	is	impossible	is	an	equally	contentious	and	implausibly	strong	claim	about	
motivation	as	(1).	As	such,	it	still	falls	foul	of	horn	(i).	
	
Why	is	Pettit	and	Smith’s	claim	implausible?	While	it	correct	that	one’s	judging	that	one’s	
belief	that	p	is	correct	or	incorrect	typically	results	in	one	forming	or	revising	a	belief	that	p,	
it’s	quite	another	thing	to	claim	these	are	just	one	and	the	same.	This	second	claim	is	what	
																																																						
4	To	our	knowledge,	no	one	in	the	literature	on	deliberative	transparency	defends	the	claim	
that	epistemic	akrasia	is	impossible;	the	closest	is	Sophie	Archer,	who	defends	the	claim	
that	it	is	impossible	to	both	judge	one	has	sufficient	evidence	for	p	and	refrain	from	
believing	p	(2017).	Some	also	doubt	whether	judging	one’s	own	beliefs	to	be	incorrect	
suffices	for	epistemic	akrasia	(Owens	2002),	but	this	does	not	matter	for	our	purposes.	Our	
concern	is	whether	such	a	state	is	possible,	not	whether	it	is	akrasia	accurately	so-called.	
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denying	the	possibility	of	epistemic	akrasia	has	to	involve;	but	this	second	claim	is	
implausibly	strong.	It	is	implausibly	strong	because	it	rules	out	certain	cases	–	like	Hume’s	
judgement	that	even	though	he	lacks	reason	for	his	beliefs	in	the	external	world,	he	can’t	
help	having	them	–	which	may	be	irrational	but	certainly	aren’t	impossible.	In	this	way,	the	
option	of	denying	the	possibility	of	epistemic	akrasia	lands	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	on	
horn	(i)	of	our	DILEMMA,	because	it	relies	on	a	claim	about	motivation	that	is	just	as	
implausibly	strong	as	the	internalism	expressed	in	(1).		
	
2.3 Can	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	appeal	to	a	more	plausible	form	of	internalism?	
	
The	other	obvious	move	for	the	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	is	to	claim	that	their	explanation	
of	transparency	only	needs	to	appeal	to	a	weaker	–	and	therefore	more	plausible	–	version	
of	internalism.	But	we	will	show	that	weaker	forms	of	internalism	are	still	vulnerable	to	our	
dilemma;	what	they	gain	in	plausibility,	they	lose	in	their	ability	to	explain	transparency.		
	
The	clearest	way	to	amend	the	implausibly	strong	form	of	internalism	expressed	in	(1)	is	as	
follows:	
	
(2) If	you’re	rational,	then:	if	you	take	it	to	be	correct	for	you	to	V,	then	you	will	be	
motivated	to	V.		
	
This	is	a	much	weaker	–	and	therefore	more	defensible	–	account	of	the	relation	between	
taking	oneself	to	be	under	a	prescription	and	following	it.		
	
However,	if	they	are	going	to	accept	(2),	then	defenders	of	TRUTH	NORM	will	also	need	to	
change	how	they	characterise	what	TRUTH	NORM	is	supposed	to	explain.	Because	(2)	is	
restricted	to	rational	motivation,	it	will	only	be	able	to	explain	the	transparency	of	rational	
doxastic	deliberation.	In	other	words,	the	explanandum	now	becomes	the	fact	that	if	you’re	
rational,	then	if	you	deliberate	about	whether	to	believe	that	p,	your	deliberation	will	be	
transparent.	This	could	allow	defenders	of	TRUTH	NORM	to	explain	deliberative	
transparency	with	the	weaker	version	of	judgement	internalism	expressed	in	(2).	
	
Can	moving	to	(2)	save	TRUTH	NORM	from	the	above	DILEMMA?	We	don’t	think	it	can.	This	
is	where	horn	(i)	of	our	DILEMMA	bites.	The	more	defensible	version	of	internalism	
expressed	in	(2)	means	that	explanandum	needs	to	be	recharacterised	as	the	transparency	
of	rational	doxastic	deliberation.	But	recharacterising	the	explanandum	in	this	manner	
means	that	TRUTH	NORM	loses	its	unique	explanatory	power,	because	other	accounts	can	
equally	well	explain	the	transparency	of	rational	doxatic	deliberation.	
	
Specifically,	recall	the	strong	dispositional	account,	which	claimed	that	belief	is	essentially	
regulated	by	dispositions	to	be	responsive	to	be	formed,	maintained,	and	revised	in	and	
only	in	response	to	truth-relevant	considerations.	Because	the	explanandum	has	now	been	
changed	to	the	fact	that	rational	doxastic	deliberation	is	transparent,	in	order	to	explain	
that	these	dispositions	need	not	be	claimed	to	be	essential	to	belief	as	such;	they	only	need	
to	be	claimed	to	be	essential	to	rational	belief.	And	if	such	dispositions	are	essential	to	
rational	belief,	that	can	perfectly	well	explain	why	rational	deliberation	about	what	to	
believe	is	motivated	by	and	only	by	truth-relevant	considerations.	Furthermore,	whereas	it	
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was	thought	to	be	problematic	to	think	of	these	strong	truth-responsive	dispositions	as	
essential	to	belief	as	such	–	because	it	had	the	result	that	the	products	of	wishful	thinking	
don’t	count	as	belief	–	it	is	not	problematic	to	think	of	these	strong	truth-responsive	
dispositions	as	essential	to	rational	belief,	because	the	products	of	wishful	thinking	aren’t	
rational	beliefs.	In	this	way,	if	the	explanandum	is	weakened	to	the	transparency	of	rational	
doxastic	deliberation,	an	alternative	dispositional	account	can	explain	the	weakened	
explanandum	just	as	well	as	TRUTH	NORM.	Weakening	the	explanandum	in	this	fashion	has	
the	result,	therefore,	that	it	is	not	best	explained	by	TRUTH	NORM.5	
	
A	second	weaker	form	of	internalism	is	in	fact	offered	by	Shah	and	Velleman.	They	
themselves	are	wary	of	the	strong	view	of	internalism	that	their	view	seems	to	require.	So	
they	offer	a	weaker	alternative	in	a	footnote	(2005,	fn.40,	533-34).	But	the	footnoted	
version	of	internalism	is	also	vulnerable	to	our	DILEMMA.	On	the	first	horn,	their	weaker	
alternative	internalism	is	in	fact	too	weak	to	explain	transparency.	On	the	second	horn,	they	
could	get	around	this	by	weakening	the	conception	of	transparency	that	they	are	trying	to	
explain.	But	if	they	do	this	then	TRUTH	NORM	isn’t	a	better	explanation	than	competitors.	
	
Let	us	explain	why.	Shah	and	Velleman	claim	that	their	argument	in	fact	only	relies	on	a	
weaker	form	of	internalism	than	(1),	which	they	outline	as	follows:		
	
”The	relevant	form	of	internalism	does	not	require	a	positive	disposition	to	obey	any	
norm	that	one	applies;	what	it	requires	is	the	lack	of	a	disposition	to	obey	a	different	
norm	instead.	One	cannot	genuinely	apply	the	norm	of	truth	to	an	attitude	while	
simultaneously	trying	only	to	make	it	conform	to	some	other,	unrelated	norm.	This	
form	of	internalism	does	not	rule	out	obedience	to	additional	norms	compatible	
with	the	one	applied.	One	can	aim	to	arrive	as	quickly	as	possible	at	a	true	cognition	
with	respect	to	p	–	in	which	case,	one	will	deliberate	in	accordance	with	a	norm	of	
speed	as	well	as	the	norm	of	truth.”	(Shah	and	Velleman	2005,	533–34,	italics	ours).		
		
We	can	formulate	Shah	and	Velleman’s	weaker	internalism	as	follows:	
	
(3) If	you	take	it	to	be	correct	for	you	to	V,	then	you	will	not	be	motivated	by	norms	
prescribing	refraining	from	V-ing.	
	
(3)	is	still	vulnerable	to	our	dilemma.	This	is	because,	according	to	(3),	someone’s	accepting	
TRUTH	NORM	does	not	entail	that	they	are	motivated	to	believe	the	truth	and	–	crucially	–	
only	the	truth.	All	that	acceptance	of	TRUTH	NORM	means,	according	this	version	of	
internalism,	is	that	one	cannot	be	motivated	only	by	non-truth-related	considerations.	But	
this	is	consistent	with	the	possibility	that	one	can	–	even	if	one	accepts	TRUTH	NORM	–	be	
motivated	in	part	by	non-truth-related	considerations	(cf.	McHugh	2013,	457).	
			
																																																						
5	McHugh	makes	a	similar	point	when	he	argues	that	a	weaker	constraint	–	which	he	calls	
‘efficacy’	–	is	only	a	feature	of	rational	doxastic	deliberation	(2013,	458–62).	Our	point	is	
more	conditional:	if	the	internalism	expressed	in	(2)	is	appealed	to,	then	only	the	
transparency	of	rational	doxastic	deliberation	can	be	explained	by	TRUTH	NORM,	which	
means	it	loses	its	unique	explanatory	power.	
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But	if	this	is	the	case,	this	seems	to	be	too	weak	to	explain	transparency.	Why?	Because	
transparency	seems	to	be	a	phenomenon	in	which	you	are	motivated	only	by	truth-relevant	
considerations.	
		
Now	Shah	and	Velleman	could	get	around	this	by	denying	this	conception	of	transparency.	
They	could	say	that	in	ordinary	or	typical	doxastic	deliberation,	we	are	only	motivated	in	
part	by	truth-relevant	considerations.	But	if	they	say	this,	then	TRUTH	NORM	isn’t	a	better	
explanation	than	competitors,	in	particular,	the	weak	dispositionalist	account,	and	they	
succumb	to	horn	(i).	So	Shah	and	Velleman’s	own	weakened	internalism	is	also	vulnerable	
to	our	DILEMMA.	
	
Both	of	these	weaker	forms	of	internalism,	therefore,	suffer	from	our	dilemma.	They	either	
mean	that	TRUTH	NORM	cannot	explain	transparency,	or	if	transparency	is	recharacterised	
so	that	TRUTH	NORM	can	explain	it,	it	no	longer	best	explains	it.	There	are,	or	course,	
alternative	weaker	versions	of	internalism	we	haven’t	discussed.	One	might	claim	that	
judging	it	is	correct	for	one	to	V	entails	being	motivated	to	V	somewhat	or	in	ideal	
circumstance.	But	there	is	every	reason	to	think	that	other	weaker	versions	will	be	just	as	
vulnerable	to	horn	(i)	of	our	DILEMMA,	for	predictable	reasons.	That	is,	they	will	require	us	
to	weaken	the	explanandum	in	such	a	way	that	TRUTH	NORM	no	longer	uniquely	explains	it.	
	
3. Does	TRUTH	NORM	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	Moore	Paradoxical	
Sentences?	
	
In	the	preceding	sections	we	have	explained	how	our	DILEMMA	works	against	the	claim	that	
TRUTH	NORM	is	the	best	explanation	of	deliberative	transparency.	We	will	now	extend	our	
basic	argumentative	strategy	in	a	novel	direction.	We	will	argue	that	our	DILEMMA	can	be	
used	to	respond	to	attempts	to	use	Moore-paradoxical	sentences	to	argue	for	TRUTH	
NORM.	The	basic	structure	of	our	argument	mirrors	those	used	above.	Attempts	to	use	
TRUTH	NORM	to	explain	Moore-paradoxical	sentences	are	vulnerable	to	our	DILEMMA.	
Either	they	are	inadequate	explanations	of	the	explanandum,	or	they	must	be	
supplemented	by	implausibly	strong	claims	about	our	motivations	to	follow	prescriptions.	
	
Moore-paradoxical	sentences	are	sentences	of	the	following	form.	
	
MP:	p,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	
	
These	sentences	can	sometimes	be	true.	Suppose	that	Donald	Trump	were	to	say:	[man-
made	climate	change	is	happening,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	man-made	climate	change	is	
happening].	This	would	be	true.	It	would	be	true	because	both	of	its	conjuncts	are	true.	The	
first	conjunct	is	true:	man-made	climate	change	is	happening.	And	the	second	conjunct	is	
true:	Trump	doesn’t	believe	that	it	is	happening	(at	least	according	to	his	Twitter	account).	
	
Although	instances	of	MP	can	be	true,	it	is	often	thought	that	there	would	be	something	
absurd,	incoherent	or	even	impossible	with	one’s	accepting	–	whether	believing	or	sincerely	
asserting	–	an	instance	of	it	from	one’s	own,	first-personal	perspective.	In	sincerely	saying,	
or	thinking:	[man-made	climate	change	is	happening,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	man-made	
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climate	change	is	happening]	Trump	would	be	doing	something	absurd,	incoherent,	or	
perhaps	even	impossible.	
	
In	the	philosophical	literature	on	these	sentences,	the	absurdity	–	in	some	form	or	other	–	is	
taken	for	granted.	The	philosophical	trick	is	to	explain	its	nature	and	source.	The	
explanation,	we	know,	can’t	appeal	to	the	inconsistency	of	the	two	conjuncts.	We	know	that	
they’re	not	necessarily	inconsistent.	So	how	can	we	explain	it?	
	
One	popular	kind	of	explanation	appeals	to	features	of	speech.	It	is	absurd	to	say,	or	assert,	
instances	of	MP	because	the	first	conjunct	of	MP	conversationally	implies	the	falsity	of	the	
second	or	is	inconsistent	with	some	conversational	principle	or	maxim,	or	some	principle	or	
maxim	governing	the	nature	of	assertion	itself.	Whilst	there	is	a	lot	to	be	said	for	this	kind	of	
approach,	it	faces	a	problem.	The	problem	is	that,	prima	facie,	the	absurdity	of	accepting	a	
Moore-paradoxical	sentence	isn’t	restricted	to	saying	or	asserting	it.	It’s	also	absurd	to	
genuinely	think	it.	Any	explanation	of	the	absurdity	of	accepting	Moore-paradoxical	
sentences	needs	to	respect	this.	The	point	is	well-put	by	Michael	Huemer:			
	
“Moore’s	Paradox	cannot	be	fully	resolved	by	appeal	to	rules	governing	solely	the	
use	of	language,	because	it	is	easy	to	construct	non-linguistic	versions	of	the	
paradox.	It	would	be	absurd	to	think	to	oneself…	the	thought,	that	it	is	raining	but	
that	one	does	not	believe	this.”	(Huemer	2007,	144)	
	
Bearing	this	in	mind,	it	isn’t	surprising	that	explanations	of	the	absurdity	of	accepting	
instances	of	MP	should	draw	on	the	nature	of	belief.	With	that	in	mind,	it	is	interesting	to	
think	about	TRUTH	NORM.	Can	TRUTH	NORM	help	to	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	an	
instance	of	MP?	You	might	think	(or	at	least	suspect)	so.	Certainly,	there	are	lots	of	
references	in	the	literature	to	the	relation	between	the	normativity	of	belief	and	the	
absurdity	of	Moore-paradoxical	sentences.	For	example,	both	Bernard	Williams	and	Peter	
Railton	claim	that	Moorean	absurdity	is	a	product	of	the	fact	that	belief	‘aims	at	truth’	
(Williams	1970,	137;	Railton	1994,	72–73),	and	those	who	defend	TRUTH	NORM	often	claim	
it	is	a	way	of	unpacking	the	idea	that	belief	aims	at	truth	(see,	e.g.,	Wedgwood	2002,	267;	
Engel	2013,	32).	It’s	not	hard	to	get	a	rough	sense	that	this	might	be	right.	
	
The	closest	to	a	developed	argument	for	TRUTH	NORM	on	the	grounds	that	it	explains	
Moore’s	paradox	is	given	by	Thomas	Baldwin	(2007).	Baldwin,	however,	phrases	his	
explanation	in	terms	of	believing	that	p	essentially	involving	a	‘normative	commitment	to	
truth’	rather	than	in	terms	of	a	truth	norm.	On	Baldwin’s	account,	Moorean	absurdity	is	
“the	absurdity	of	embracing,	within	a	single	assertion	or	judgment,	a	commitment	both	to	
the	truth	of	p	and	to	one’s	being	committed	to	the	falsehood	of	p;	for	even	though	this	act	
does	not	entail	that	one	is	committed	to	the	falsehood	of	p,	it	is	absurd	to	commit	oneself	
to	having	such	a	commitment	just	when	one	also	commits	oneself	to	the	truth	of	p”	
(Baldwin	2007,	88).	For	simplicity,	and	because	this	idea	of	a	normative	commitment	to	
truth	is	not	entirely	clear	(is	it	more	than	just	a	belief	that	p	is	true?),	we	will	consider	a	
parallel	explanation	which	attempts	to	explain	Moorean	absurdity	explicitly	in	terms	of	
TRUTH	NORM.	
	
3.1 Does	TRUTH	NORM	help?	
	 12	
	
TRUTH	NORM,	recall,	states:	
	
TRUTH	NORM:	It	is	a	conceptual	truth	about	belief	that	it	is	correct	to	believe	a	
proposition	if	and	only	if	it	is	true.	
	
Suppose	that	this	is	correct.	Can	it	be	used	to	explain	what’s	absurd	about	accepting	MP?	
Our	argument	will	be	that	it	doesn’t	–	it	is	vulnerable	to	our	DILEMMA.	
	
Let’s	begin	however	by	thinking	about	how	TRUTH	NORM	might	be	thought	to	explain	the	
absurdity	of	accepting	MP.	If	we	assume	TRUTH	NORM,	then	one	who	accepts	MP	will	be	
committed	by	its	first	conjunct	to:	[It	is	correct	to	believe	that	p].	So,	if	we	assume	TRUTH	
NORM,	then	one	who	accepts	MP	is	committed	to:	
	
MP*:	It	is	correct	to	believe	that	p,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	
	
So,	if	TRUTH	NORM	is	true,	then	the	Moore-paradoxical	sentence,	MP,	commits	one	who	
accepts	it	to	claiming	-	simultaneously	-	that	it	would	be	correct	to	do	(or	be	doing)	
something,	and	that	one	isn’t	doing	that	thing.	Perhaps	that’s	what’s	absurd	about	
accepting	MP:	it’s	absurd	to	simultaneously	accept	that	it	is	correct	to	do	(or	be	doing)	
something,	and	that	one	isn’t	doing	that	thing.	
	
Does	this	really	help	to	explain	what’s	strange	about	accepting	MP?	An	obvious	response	is:	
no,	it’s	not	really	strange	–	certainly	not	incoherent,	absurd	or	impossible	-	to	judge	that	one	
is	under	a	prescription	to	respond	in	some	way,	but	that	one	isn’t	responding	in	that	way.	
Think	about	ordinary	cases	in	which	the	prescription	takes	the	form	of	an	‘ought’	fact	rather	
than	a	correctness	fact.	For	example,	suppose	I	judge:	[I	ought	to	give	money	to	charity,	but	
I	don’t].	In	making	this	judgment,	I	don’t	seem	to	be	saying	anything	strange	or	absurd	and	
certainly	not	something	impossible.	It	seems	like	a	rather	normal	thing	to	judge.	In	fact,	I	
judge	it	frequently.6	Contrast	it	with:	[Climate	change	is	happening,	but	I	don’t	believe	it	is	
happening].	This	really	does	seem	strange.	There	is	a	big	difference,	in	that	respect,	
between	these	two	judgments.	So,	one	might	think,	it	is	mistaken	to	attempt	to	explain	the	
absurdity	of	accepting	Moore-paradoxical	sentences	by	using	TRUTH	NORM	to	change	MP	
into	MP*.	
	
Perhaps,	however,	this	is	too	simple.	Perhaps	a	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	would	do	better	
by	supplementing	the	basic	structure	of	explanation	(i.e.	that	MP	commits	one	to	MP*)	in	
some	way.	How	could	we	do	that?	One	might	try	to	claim	that	there	is	something	irrational	
																																																						
6	It	will	be	helpful	here	to	forestall	an	objection.	We	are	not	claiming	here	that	there	is	
nothing	strange,	absurd,	or	irrational	about	the	situation	in	which	in	which	I	judge	that	I	
ought	to	give	charity,	but	don’t	do	so.	We	are	claiming	that	there	is	nothing	necessarily	
strange,	absurd,	or	irrational	about	a	judgement	with	the	content	[I	ought	to	give	money	to	
charity,	but	I	don’t],	because	it	might	be	a	psychologically	astute	judgement	about	my	moral	
failings.	We	show	how	this	distinction	matters,	and	undermines	the	argument	for	TRUTH	
NORM,	in	section	3.3.	(We	are	grateful	to	Christos	Kyriacou	in	pressing	us	to	clarify	this	
point).	
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about	judging	MP*,	and	hence	MP.	This	strategy	seems	to	have	something	to	recommend	it.	
It’s	easy	to	suspect	that	there	is	something	irrational	in	accepting	MP*.	And	if	in	fact	it	is	
irrational,	then	we	could	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	MP*,	and	hence	MP,	in	these	
terms.	it	would	be	impossible	for	a	rational	person	to	judge	MP*	and	hence	MP.	TRUTH	
NORM	would	have	allowed	us	to	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	MP*	and	hence	MP.	
	
There	are,	however,	major	problems	with	this	strategy,	two	of	which	we	will	detail.	The	first	
problem	is	that	this	is	the	wrong	kind	of	explanation	of	the	absurdity	of	judging	MP.	The	
second,	more	serious	problem,	is	that	it	doesn’t	work	as	an	explanation	of	the	absurdity	of	
judging	MP	anyway	because	it	fails	on	our	DILEMMA.	
	
3.2 First	Problem:	Wrong	Kind	of	Explanation	
	
The	first	problem	is	really	a	preliminary.	Suppose	that	it	is	rationally	impossible	to	accept	
MP.	The	problem	is	that	it	isn’t	obvious	that	this	is	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	the	
absurdity	of	accepting	MP.	It	doesn’t	yield	the	right	kind	of	absurdity.	
	
Why	not?	Simply	put:	If	the	problem	with	believing	MP	is	that	it	is	rationally	impossible,	
then	we	should	expect	someone	irrational	to	be	able	to	do	it.	But	I’m	not	sure	that	we	do	
expect	this.	It	is	not	at	all	obvious	that	it	is	possible	for	an	irrational	person	to	believe	[p,	but	
I	don’t	believe	that	p].	Believing	[p,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	p]	is,	we	might	think,	more	like	
psychologically	impossible	than	rationally	impossible.	Even	if	you’re	irrational,	you	simply	
won’t	be	able	to	hold	this	belief	(though	of	course	you	may	believe	that	you	hold	it).	
	
It	is	useful	here	to	refer	back	to	the	discussion	of	deliberative	transparency	in	the	earlier	
part	of	the	paper.	There	we	noted	that	it	is	unsatisfactory	to	explain	deliberative	
transparency	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	merely	rationally	impossible	to	violate	transparency	in	
deliberation.	It	is	not	clear	that	this	is	the	right	kind	of	impossibility.	It	isn’t	obviously	
possible	for	an	irrational	person	to	violate	deliberative	transparency,	nor	would	it	obviously	
be	irrational	should	someone	for	whom	it	is	possible	violate	it.		Much	the	same,	I	think,	is	
true	with	Moore-paradoxical	sentences.		
	
3.3 Second	Problem:	Applying	our	Dilemma	
	
The	second	problem	is	more	serious.	According	to	the	view	we	are	considering	it	is	irrational	
to	judge	MP*.	The	problem,	as	noted	above,	is	that	it	isn’t	obvious	that	it	is	irrational.	
Certainly,	we	wouldn’t	want	to	just	assert	that	it	is.	We	would	need	some	reason	or	
argument	for	thinking	that	it	is.	Ideally,	we	would	want	a	general	principle	that	explains	why	
it	is	irrational.	What	might	such	a	principle	look	like?	
	
The	obvious	place	to	look	in	this	area	is	to	some	form	of	judgment	internalism	or	enkratic	
principle	more	broadly.	According	to	a	simplified,	classic	form	of	judgment	internalism	(this	
was	already	referenced	in	the	discussion	of	transparency	above	but	we’ve	specified	the	
scope	here	for	reasons	that	will	be	clear	shortly):	
	
(4) If	you’re	rational,	then:	if	you	judge	it	is	correct	to	V,	then	you	will	be	motivated	to	V.	
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This	kind	of	claim	is	not	uncontroversial,	but	it	is	often	defended	in	some	form	or	other.	
Let’s	suppose	it	is	true.	Let’s	suppose,	furthermore,	that	there	are	no	problems	with	V-ing	
standing	for	believing	(as	well	as	acting,	as	it	does	in	standard	formulations).		
	
This	kind	of	claim	is	not	uncontroversial,	but	it	is	often	defended	in	some	form	or	other.	
Let’s	suppose	it	is	true.	Let’s	suppose,	furthermore,	that	there	are	no	problems	with	V-ing	
standing	for	believing	(as	well	as	acting,	as	it	does	in	standard	formulations).	Could	it	be	
used	to	explain	why	it	is	irrational	to	judge	MP*,	and	hence	MP?	We	don’t	think	it	could.	
What	we	need	to	explain	is	why	it	is	irrational	to	judge:	it	is	correct	to	believe	that	p,	but	I	
don’t	believe	that	p.	But	(4)	won’t	help	us	to	explain	the	irrationality	of	this	judgement.	(4)	
would	only	help	us	to	explain	why	it	is	irrational	not	to	believe	p,	having	judged	that	it	is	
correct	to	believe	p.		
	
Consider	an	example	from	the	domain	of	action	that	can	help	to	make	this	contrast	
intuitive.	According	to	classical	judgment	internalists,	it	is	irrational	for	one	to	judge	[I	ought	
to	give	money	to	charity],	and	then	not	give	money	to	charity.	It	is	a	form	of	practical	
irrationality.	But	these	same	judgment	internalists	don’t	claim	that	it	is	irrational	for	one	to	
judge	[I	ought	to	give	money	to	charity,	but	I	don’t	give	money	to	charity].	Classical	
judgment	internalism	doesn’t	entail	that	this	is	irrational	at	all.	It	might	just	be	a	
psychologically	astute	judgment.	Similarly	for	MP.	Classical	judgment	internalism	doesn’t	
seem	to	show	that	it	would	be	irrational	to	make	the	judgment	[p,	but	I	don’t	believe	p].	
Again,	we	can	think	about	this	in	terms	of	the	first	horn	of	our	DILEMMA.	TRUTH	NORM	
supplemented	by	(4)	isn’t	a	good	explanation	of	the	explanandum.	It	doesn’t	explain	the	
absurdity	of	accepting	Moore-paradoxical	sentences	at	all.	
	
This	argument	demonstrates	that	classical	judgment	internalism	or	enkratic	principles	don’t	
show	that	it	is	irrational	to	accept	MP*,	and	hence	MP.	It	also	helps	us	to	see	what	kind	of	
principle	we	would	need	to	do	this.	The	principle	would	have	to	look	like	this:	
	
(5) If	you’re	rational,	then:	you	won’t	judge	[It	is	correct	to	V,	but	I’m	not	V-ing].	
	
If	this	general	principle	were	true,	then	judging	MP*,	and	hence	judging	MP,	would	be	
irrational.	As	a	consequence,	we	would	have	some	kind	of	explanation	of	the	absurdity	of	
accepting	MP.	
	
So	far	so	good.	The	problem,	however,	is	that,	there’s	no	very	good	independent	reason	to	
accept	(5).	As	we	noted	above,	it	doesn’t	seem	irrational	to	make	this	judgment	in	ordinary	
non-doxastic	cases.	One	might	judge:	[I	ought	to	give	money	to	charity,	but	I	don’t	given	
money	to	charity].	I’m	not	thereby	be	irrational,	at	least	not	obviously	so.	Certainly,	there	
doesn’t	seem	to	be	anything	really	strange	about	this	judgment.	It’s	nothing	like	judging	
that	climate	change	is	happening,	but	I	don’t	believe	it	is	happening.	So	this	principle	is	
under-motivated.		
	
We	can	think	about	this	in	terms	of	the	second	horn	of	our	dilemma.	If	we	supplement	
TRUTH	NORM	with	(5)	we	could,	potentially,	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	MP.	But	(5)	
is	an	implausible	claim	about	the	relation	between	accepting	prescriptions	and	acting	on	
them.	So	whether	TRUTH	NORM	is	supplemented	with	(4)	or	with	(5),	it	fails	to	escape	our	
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dilemma.	So	TRUTH	NORM	doesn’t	explain	the	absurdity	of	accepting	Moore-paradoxical	
sentences.	
	
There	is	a	vast	literature	on	Moore’s	Paradox	that	we	have	not	discussed.	There	are	
responses	available	to	a	defender	of	TRUTH	NORM	that	we	do	not	discuss	in	detail.	We	also	
do	not	discuss	approached	to	Moore’s	Paradox	in	terms	of	knowledge-based	norms	on	
belief,	which	may	be	more	promising.	Our	aim	has	simply	been	to	highlight	how	our	basic	
strategy	–	from	discussing	deliberative	transparency	–	is	prima	facie	applicable	when	
thinking	about	whether	Moore’s	Paradox	supports	TRUTH	NORM.		
	
4. Conclusion	
	
We	have	argued	that	attempts	to	use	TRUTH	NORM	to	explain	deliberative	transparency	
and	Moore-paradoxical	sentences	fail	on	a	common	dilemma.	As	a	consequence,	we	don’t	
think	that	TRUTH	NORM	is	well-supported.	If	we	are	right,	then	TRUTH	NORM	can’t	be	the	
basis	for	a	satisfactory	middle-ground	in	meta-epistemology.	
	
There	is	a	more	general	point	in	the	background.	Both	of	the	arguments	for	TRUTH	NORM	
that	we	have	considered	–	from	deliberative	transparency	and	Moore-paradoxical	
sentences	-	are	really	attempts	to	show	that	TRUTH	NORM	does	important	explanatory	
work	in	the	philosophy	of	mind.	More	specifically,	they	are	attempts	to	show	that	TRUTH	
NORM	explains	some	mental	phenomenon	that	relates	what	we	can	(or	cannot)	believe	to	
the	truth	of	the	content	of	that	belief.	We	think	that	this	kind	of	argument	is	bound	to	fail.	It	
is	bound	to	fail	because,	if	TRUTH	NORM	is	to	provide	a	uniquely	good	explanation	of	the	
mental	phenomenon	in	question,	it	will	have	to	make	use	of	an	overly	strong	claim	about	
the	relation	between	our	accepting	the	prescriptions	that	supposedly	constitute	belief,	and	
what	we	subsequently	can	or	cannot	believe.	Because	of	this	general	structure,	we	are	
optimistic	that	our	argumentative	strategy	will	generalise.	Specifically,	we	are	optimistic	
that	our	argumentative	strategy	will	undermine	other	attempts	to	show	that	constitutive	
norms	on	attitudes	are	justified	by	their	role	in	explaining	the	impossibility	of	mental	
phenomena.	
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